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"ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION  AND  THE  COMMUNITY  BUDGET"  ~/'7 Q. cfl/ 
lt3 a,;J 
'Why  is the  Commission  advocating Economic  and 
Monetary Union  for  t~e European Community  When  it must 
be  clear that the idea is simply not on at the moment? 
Don~ you as  a  practical politician think it is absurd?" 
That in essence is the  question  I  have  been asked many 
times  since Roy  Jenkins, after consulting the rest of us, 
committed  the Commdssion  to this proposition last autumn. 
It is based on  the  assumption  that  the  Commission 
should  be only concerned with proposals  that have  a  chance 
of acceptance by  the Member  States  - if not at the  next 
Council Meeting then within the reasonably near future. 
On  that basis, of course,  our ideas  have  no  chance of 
success. 
But  the  Commission has  another  task as well.  It 
...  should draw attention to problems,  suggest solutions and 
point  the way  forward.  In doing  so  .. it should concern 
itself both with  the  construction of  Europe  and with issues 
that are or will  be  of direct concern  to ordinary people. 
As  an  independent political institution it should  campaign 
for its ideas  and  try to  create a  climate of opinion in 
which what is impossible  now,  can become  practical and 
eventually be  carried into effect. 
We  are now  ./. 
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We  are now  campaigning for  EMU  both because it is 
central to our long term aim of developing the  Community 
and  bec~~s~~ we 'believe.' it'~:w-±11 provide  a  framework within 
which  Eurbpe' s  central political-economic  prol?lf,~ms of high 
'-':~~~::, 
unemployment,  low investment  and  inadequate growth  can be 
tackled~  It will not of itself solve  those  problems.  But 
it will remove  a.··  number  of obstacles  to overcoming  them 
which now\exist. 
There is certainly an urgent need for new  ideas.  It 
.  :~'--~r~·'~riow  fl~~- ·;~~~~::··~in'C\:.fh~·.-o]J, .-crisis signalled the  end of 
the  .. high and more  or. -~.ess  continuous  economic  growth which 
characterised the nirie.teen fifties and sixties.  Since  1973 
the Member  States of  the  Comnunity have  tried a  variety of 
different policies  to restore prosperity,  but their economic 
performance is still inadequate  to fulfil the  expectations 
or even the needs  of their electorates. 
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How  long  can we  go  on like this?  Few  see any  prospect 
of  an upturn of  econo.mic  activity in the  imnediate future. 
¥e·t it is estimated that betweeh>now and  1985  nine million 
more  yo~mg p:e,ople  will  join the  Community  work force,  than 
"\"  ~.: 
old people will  leave it.  Moreover,'  the difficulties this 
will create will be greatly exacerbated by  the mounting  pressure 
which many  vital. sectors of  European Industry,  including steel, 
textiles and  shipbuilding, will continue  to  experience  from  low 
cost competitors  in-the rest of  the world. 
If economic  ./. 3 
If economic reality continues  to fall far short of 
people's expectations,  increasing strain will be  placed on 
the fabric of political life in all Member  States.  Amid 
mounting disillusionment the  proponents  of extremist 
ideologies will find  golden opportunities.  The  Commission 
has  a  duty  to point out how  in its view a  further development 
of  the  Community  could provide  an opportunity to  escape  from 
the  impasse. 
At present policy makers  in both  the weak and  strong 
countries find their freedom of action desparately circumscribed. 
Normally when  faced with  low growth,  spare capacity and high 
unemployment  a  government would reflate.  But in present 
conditions of extreme  exchange rate instability a  country with 
a  vulnerable  currency cannot  do  so  to  the  extent necessary 
before its exchange  rate goes  through  the floor,  and its 
inflation rate  through  the ceiling. 
A country with a  low inflation rate and  a  healthy 
balance of payments  ism this respect not much  better off. 
The  strong economies  of Europe,  unlike  the u.s.,  depend 
very much  on exports,  and  in Germany,  our strongest economy, 
they account for about  24%  of  GNP,  and  about  40%  of  them  go  to 
other Community  countries.  Consequently foreign orders must  .  . 
play a  critical role in any  recovery.  A purely  domestic 
reflation is likely to have  only  a  limited effect on  employment, 
and  Germany's  future prospects must  therefore depend  in a  large 
part upon the action taken by her partners. 
With  a  single  ./. 4 
With  a  single European currency,  the exchange  rate 
constraints at present experienced  by  most of the other 
Member  States would  be  much  reduced which will make it easier to 
pursue growth directed policies.  In  some  Community  countries 
there are,  of  course,  other  formidable  barriers  impeding 
sustained growth,  including structural defects  in their 
economies  and  the antiquated attitudes of  many  trade  unionists 
and  managers.  But  a  monetary  union would  provide  a  more  stable 
and  satisfactory framework  in which  to get to grips with 
problems of this kind. 
EMU  will have other advantages  as well. 
Among  the many  factors  restricting new  investment in the 
Community is fear of  exchange  risks.  In  the last five years  -
not  long  in terms  of  the  time it takes  to  transform  a  board 
decision into  a  multi-million pound  plant working at full 
capacity  - the  relationsh~p between  some  European currencies 
has  altered by  as  much  as  122  per cent.  In  such  circumstances 
the risks inherent in any  large scale investment are  enormously 
increased('.  With  a  single currency  those risks would  be 
removed,  and  in my  view  this would 'create  a  much  more  favourable 
climate for  trade  and  investment. 
j. One  of  the  reason 5 
One of the reasons  for  the change  in currency values 
has,  of course,  been differential inflation rates.  A  single 
European currency would  not mean  the  end of inflationary 
pressures.  But for  those countries with the worst records 
it would provide  the dramatic  break with the past that has 
helped to overcome  deeply rooted inflation psycholigies  in 
national contexts.  It would  also provide  the opportunity 
to establish a  monetary authority with more  discretion to 
control monetary aggregates  in future  than  those  totally 
under  the  thumb of  a  single government. 
The  European  currency could in addition provide  the 
alternative to the dollar as  an  irtternational reserve  that 
the world  so badly needs.  At present even  a  country  as 
powerful as Germany  finds  its exchange  rate,  and  so  the 
competitiveness of its industry,  vulnerable  to movements  in 
the dollar arising from  US  Government  decisions often  taken 
largely on  the basis of domestic considerations. 
---
If we  had  a  European  currency the ability of the Member 
States together to control  these questions would  be greater 
than is often the case  now  when  they  supposedly  have  the 
independent power  to do  so ..  A  reserve  currency backed  by  a 
weak  economy  causes  great problems  as  Britain well  knows. 
But as  the  US  has  shown  such  a  currency  backed  by  a  strong 
economy  provides  the holder with greater freedom of manoeuvre 
in deciding on its economic  strategy  . 
• /. Clearly-the bigger ------------------------------·------~~-~--·- -
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Clearly the bigger the  Community  becomes  the more 
difficult EMU  will be  to attain.  But by  the  same  token  the 
greater ·the  need for it will be.  The  coordination of economic 
policy and the creation of  a  single currency which it will 
provide should be  the  foundations  on which  the next stage 
of the Community's  development will be  based.  As  the 
diversity of the membership  increases  the more  important it 
becomes  for  the  foundations  to be  firm  and durable. 
My  concern  today,  however,  is not primarily with the 
reasons  for  EMU,  but rather with the means  by  which it can be 
attained.  And  since my  personal  responsibility as  a  European 
Commissioner is for  the  European  Budget,  I  want  to concentrate 
in particular upon  the nature  and  the cost of  the powerful 
fiscal mechanisms  financed  through that budget which  the 
Commission believes must  necessarily accompany  the successful 
introduction of a  common  Community  currency. 
The  purpose of  the  new  financial. instruments which would 
have  to  accornpany.monetary  union would  be  to  secure  a  more  equal 
distribution of  resources  between  the Member  States.  This  would 
be  necessary because,  although monetary  union would certainly 
bring enormous  economic  gains  to  the  Community  as  a  whole,  it 
is unlikely that  - without deliberate intervention  - these  gains 
would  be  spread evenly.  On  the contrary,  in the absence  of 
adequate safeguards,  the  changed pattern of production  and 
employment  likely to characterise a  Community  with  a  single currency 
is one  in which weaker  regions or nations  could easily suffer  he.!;!Vil~ 7 
Obviously  no  Member  State of the Community is likely 
to assent to monetary  union  - which will entail the  loss 
of its separate ability to control both exchange  rates and 
also monetary and  to  some  extent fiscal policy  - if for it the 
economic consequences  are likely to  be adverse. 
Nor  indeed would it be  in the best interests of the 
stronger Member  States to press for  a  union of  a  kind which 
would  impoverish their weaker partners.  For  the stronger 
member states can only  hope  to maintain their prosperity if 
the rest of the  Community  is able  to provide  them with  a 
stable and  buoyant market for their exports.  Moreover, 
the unchecked  and  intensive  e9onomic  development of 
some  parts of  the Community at the  expense of the others would 
inevitably - especially in a  Community  enlarged  to  include 
Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal  - lead  to very considerable 
migration,  entailing not only the  further decline of poor 
areas,  but also unacceptable congestion in rich ones. 
How  Much  Redistribution?  -----------------------
But,  granted that monetary  union must,  for political 
ancl  economic  r~asons be  accompanied  by  a  geographical 
redistribution of resources,  just how  great should that 
redistribution be? 
....  ./. The  obvious  point 8 
The  obvious point of  departure  for  any  atter..pt  to 
answer  this question is an  inVestigation of existing monetary 
unions.  And  the Macdougall  Committee  - a  group of 
independent experts set up  by  the  Commission~has in fact 
recently made  a  detailed study of geographical redistribution 
in  5  federations  - West  Germany,  the United States,  Canada, 
Australia and Switzerland  - and  three unitary states  - Italy, 
France  and  the United  Kingdom. 
The  Macdougall  Committee's  research has  revealed that in 
these eight countries public expenditure and  taxation reduce 
regional inequality very considerably indeed.  The  average 
extent of equalisation by  these me?ns  of differences  in average 
per capita  .incomes  between  the richest and  poorest regions  was 
found  to be  about  40  per cent  - France  and Australia being 
,· .  .. 
above  this figure,  and  the United States and  Germany  below. 
Another of  the  Cornrni ttee'  s  findings  was  that as  v1ell  as 
redistributing  income  regionally  on  a  continuing basis,  public 
finance  in existing economic  unions  also plays  a  major  role  in 
protecting weaker  regions  from  the full  impact of short  term 
and  cyclical economic  fluctuations.  For example,  the Committee 
reckQned,  on  the .basis of English  and Italian data,  that one  half 
to  two  thirds of  a  short  term  loss of primary  income  in a  region 
due  to fall in its external  sales may  be  automatically offset 
.through lower  payments  of  tax and  insurance contributions  to 
the  centr~and through higher  receipts of  unemployment  and 
other benefits. 
'  ........ 
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But would  the differences  in living standards  between 
the  stronger and  poorer f.1ember  States of  the  Community  have 
to be  reduced  by  the  same  percentage as  public  finance  reduces 
the differences between rich and  poor regions within the nation 
states which the MacDougall  Committee  studied? 
The  answer  to this question may  well  be  no.  It is true 
that the present inequality in average per capita  incomes 
between  the richer and poorer Member  States of  the  Community  -
an  inequality which  has  been  scarcely affected by  the very 
small  Community  Budget  - is at least as  great as  the  regional 
income differences within the eight countries  investigated would 
be were it not for  the fact that public expenditure and  taxation 
substantially reduce  them.  But it does  not necessarily  follow 
from  this that to sustain  a  monetary  union  the  Community  needs 
to achieve  the  same  degree of equalisation as  those countries. 
One  reason  for  this is that although,  as  I  have  pointed out, 
the absence of substantial redistributive mechanisms  would, 
in the event of  a  monetary  ~nion,  stimulate  considerable 
intra-Community migration,  the barriers of language  and 
separate national culture would  almost certainly ensure  that 
this migration was  on  a  smaller scale  than could  be  anticipated 
within most other integrated industrial economies, if redistributivE 
policies were  not pursued. 
./. -------------------------------------
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Another  reason  why  less redistribution may  be  necessary 
is  tha~-even when  the Community  becomes  a  monetary union it will 
undoubtedly  remain  in many  respects  a  much  looser politicaL 
entity than the nation states which  comprise it.  In these 
circumstances,  the  inhabitants of the weaker  Member  States 
are unlikely to expect  the  same  degree of economic  equality 
in relation to  the  inhabitants of the stronger members,  as 
those  living in the poorer regions of a  particular country 
usually demand  in relation to  those  living in the  same  country's 
richer areas. 
But  there can be  no  certainty,  about  just how  much 
difference  these factors  would make-and  the MacDougall 
Committee  therefore  decided  that it would  be  safest to 
proceed on the working hypothesis  that the  amount  of 
equalisation required to  support  a  single Community  currency 
would  in fact be  the  same  as  that achieved  in existing 
monetary  unions.  This  seems  to me  sensible.  In matters of 
this kind it is much  better to err in  the direction of 
pessimism  than to be  open  to  the  charge of being over-sanguine. 
·  Yet  on  th~ face  of it such  a  hypothesis  may  appear  to 
raise formidable difficulties,  for  the national  public  finance 
systems  which  achieve  the  substantial regional equalisation found 
in existing unions  are  unquestionably very costly  :  on  average, 
expenditure by  the  federal  governments  of unitary states which 
the MacDougall  Committee  studied is about  30  per cent of gross 
national product. 
./. At  present 11 
At present· the Community  Budget is only  0.7  per cent 
of the Community's  gross  domestic  product.  If,  in order 
to attain the  same  degree of equaiisation as  in existing 
unions,  this  figure  had  to be raised to  about  30  per cent 
of Community  GDP,  there would  frankly  be little point in 
discussing the matter further.  The  political obstacles would 
certainly be  deemed  too great. 
Happily,  however,  there are good  grounds  for  believing  __ 
that a  measure of equalisation similar in scale  to that found 
in existing monetary  unions  can  in fact  be  achieved  by  means 
of proportionately very much  lowe~ sums  of public money  than 
those unions  choose  to  spend. 
The  reasons  for  thinking that this is so  stem  from  a 
study of the ways  in which  geographical  redistribution is in 
fact achieved. 
Investigation reveals that existing monetary  unions  use 
a  wide variety of redistributive instruments;  that the  mix  of 
instruments differs  from  union  to union;  and  that the various 
instruments  and  the various possible combinations of instruments 
vary enormously in  terms  of the amount of regional  equalisation 
which  they secure per unit of expenditure. 
./.  In  this 12 
In this context,  there is a  very  important distinction 
between unitary and  federal  states.  In unitary states  a 
great deal of the total redistribution between  regions  arises 
from expenditures on public goods  and  services which  provide 
roughly equal per capita benefits,  (these being redistributive 
in terms of their effect on  regional  income  differentials) ; 
and also  from  the social security system which  tends  to provide 
most support to  poor regions with high ratios of children, 
women  not seeking work  and retired people  - a  process  observed 
most clearly in France  and  Italy,  where  male  workers  migrate 
from  poor areas  in very  large numbers.  A  significant but 
smaller degree of inter-regional redistribution in unitary 
states is due  to  a  regionally progressive  tax  system. 
In federal states,  in contrast,  while  some  redistribution 
is achieyed  through  expenditure on  goods  and  services providing 
equal per capita benefits,  a  high proportion of total 
redistribution is also achieved  thfough  the  use of 
intergovernmental grants.  These  grants are  by  far  the most 
effici~nt instruments  of redistribution  found  in existing 
monetary unions,  reducing  inter-regional differences dramatically 
for relatively very small  sums  of expenditure . 
. /.  In the Federal 13 
In the federal  states which  the MacDougall  Committee 
studied,  intergovernmental grants achieve  an  average 
reduction of about  19  per cent in average  regional  income 
differentials for  average  expenditure of only  3.7 per cent of 
GDP.  This is possible mainly  because  the net regional 
transfers which  these grants  achieve  are to  a  much  lesser 
extent than in the unitary countries,  the result of differences 
between  large gross  payments  in opposing directions i.e.  in and 
out of the central ,,.budget.  In  a  unitary state most of  the  tax 
pa~d in a  region passes outside its frontiers  to  the centre. 
Central government,  therefore,  can only  secure  a  net transfer 
to that region's  advantage if it pays  back  to it an  even 
larger  sum  than  the considerable  revenue which it has 
extracted.  The  component states of  a  federation,  on  the other 
hand,  pay  a  much  smaller proportion of  their total tax burden 
into the  federal  budget,  and  the outflow of resources  in taxation 
which  the federal  government  has  to offset before its spending 
in  a  poor state has  a  net equalising effect is therefore 
correspondingly  lower  • 
. "· 
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The  Different Kinds  of Grants  -----------------------------
Grants  used  for  redistribution can  be divided into 
two  main categories.  First there are general  purpose  grants. 
In Canada  and Australia,  for  example,  there are major general 
purpose grant systems  designed  to raise the  fiscal capacity 
of poorer states up  to  a  politically determined  standard  -
to  100  per cent of  the  national  average  in Canada,  and  to the 
standard of the  two  dominant  and wealthiest states in Australia. 
These grants are intended to enable state levels of government 
to provide adequate  standards of public services without  forcing 
poorer states to  impose significantly higher  tax burdens, 
and without depriving state governments  of  the  freedom  to 
manage  these services according  to  their own  preferences. 
The  second  kind of grant is the  "specific purpose  grant" 
which is used  for  the pursuit of  a  particular objective.  The 
most  important  form  of these is the matching grant whereby  the 
federal  government provides  a  given percentage of  the total of 
a  speci_fic public  expenditure  programme  which  the state 
government wishes  to  pursue.  In  some  matching grant systems 
the percentage provided by  the  federal  government is the  same 
whicheve  states. are  the recipients,  but in others  - and  this 
obviously ensures  greater geographical redistribution - the 
percentage provided  by  the  federal  authorities varies  accordin~ 
to individual states fiscal capacity,  providing  foT  ~xGI'mple, 
80  per Gent of  the total  for  the poorest states,  anti  only 
20  per cent for  the richest.  For  the most part,  these  gra~ts 
are given in one  of  five  areas of policy  :  health,  welfare, 
transport and  regional development. 
./. Of  the  two  kinds .  .  .. 
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Of  the  two  main kinds of grant,  general purpose 
grants are,  in redistributive terms,  by  far  the most 
cost effective.  For an  average  expenditure of  2.5 per cent 
of GDP  on specific purpose  grants,  the  federal  governments 
studied secure  a  6  per cent compression of differences  in 
income  per capita between states.  For an  average  expenditure of 
1.2 per cent of  GDP  on  general  purpose grants  the  same 
federations  secure  a  reduction in income differentials of 
13  per cent.  The highest federal expenditure on  general 
p~rpose grants is in Australia,  at 3.4  per cent of  GDP. 
The  results are spectacular  :  differences  in average  incomes 
between Australian states are in consequence  reduced  by  about 
a  quarter. 
T~~-~~QE~-~t-~2~~~!tY_~~Y§1_EQ~_Q§!~g_th~-~Q~t-~~~!~!~~t 
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The  discovery of the effectiveness of  federal  grants 
suggests  the ·way  in which  a  considerable  amount  of redistribution 
within  the Community  can·be  secured.  Admittedly,  to establish 
which are  the most efficient methods  of redistribution is not 
necessarily to  have  the opportunity  ~o use  them.  If many  of 
th~ spending  p~ograrnmes of unitary and  federal  states,  for 
examp>le~~t.heir social security policies,  have  only  a  relatively 
small  geographic  redistributive  effect per unit of expenditure 
that does  not reflect inefficiency or  incompetence  - but rather 
the fact that redistribution is not,  in these  instances,  the only 
nor  even  the  primary objective.  A  modern  nation state whether 
unitary or federal  has  numerous  and extensive responsibilities  . 
. /.  In  a  world 16 
_.In  a  world of finite resources it often has  to pursue _ 
policies which  simultaneously fulfil a  number of purposes  -
including geographical equalisation adequately,  but do  not 
always  achieve every individual objective as  satisfactorily 
or completely as  could be managed if it alone  was  the  end 
in view. 
Similarly,  the  Community  has objectives other than 
redistribution.  Therefore it would  be  wrong  to suggest that 
,,,,f,ot..· 
it is in a  position to concentrate  the resources  likely to  be 
at its disposal purely and  simply on  the most efficient transfer 
policies.  But at the  same  time,  the Community's  present and 
likely future responsibilities are more  limited  than  those of 
the Member  States.  And  in consequence of  this the  Community 
is in  a  position to give efficient methods  of redistribution 
a  very high priority. 
As  the Budget Commissioner,  I  have  frequently  stated the 
broad criteria which  I  and  my  colleagues believe should determine 
the ·policy objectives  pursued at Community  level.  We  strongly 
believe that the Community  should only  be  responsible  for 
carrying out those  necessary  tasks which it can  discharge better 
or more  cheaply  than other levels of government.  We  also 
believe that in current economic  circumstances  the  Community 
should as  far as  possible not pursue policies which entail an 
increase  in total public expenditure at all levels of  the 
Community:  this means  to  a  large extent concentrating  upon 
transferring existing activities  from  national to  eornmunity 
level,  rather  than  upon  initiating new  ones. 17 
The  MacDougall  Committee  has  described  a  hypothetical 
future  Community  Budget in line with these criteria.  They 
divide  spending programmes  at all levels of government  into 
three headings  "Social Welfare  Services_",  "Economic  Services", 
and  "General Public Services".  Under  "Social  and Welfare 
Services",· they envisage very little community  development. 
Responsibility for health,  education,  social security and 
welfare would essentially remain at national  level.  Community 
expenditure in this area would  in the main  be devoted  to  a 
general purpose equalisation mechanism making  transfers  to  the 
weakest member  states to enable  them  to  top  up  their own 
budget efforts.  There  would also  be .specific expenditure in the 
context of European  redevelopment  programmes. 
As  regards  "Economic  Services",  the  Community  would  be 
extensively involved in structural and  sectoral actions  covering 
agriculture,  public infrastructure,  industrial,  regional  and 
labour market policies,  but would  aim  for  the most part at 
selective intervention to  a  great extent through specific 
purpose of grants  (with variable matching ratios)  designed  to 
complement member  states'  actions  and  to assist the vleakest 
member states in particular. 
./. Especial  emphasis 
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Especial emphasis  would  be put on  improving productivity 
in the weakest states.  This is an essential feature of any 
proposal  for monetary  union for  there is an  obvious  danger  that 
once  the Community  has  a  single currency,  wage-earners  in the 
poorer Member  States will  demand  wage  levels equal  to  those of their 
counterparts  in the richer ones  with  - in the  absence  of  improvement 
in productivity  - severely inflationary effects. 
As  regards  "·General  Public Service ·". the Community's  share 
of expenditure on public administration and  law and order would 
remain very small.  But  the  Community would,  however,  account  for 
all foreign aid expenditure and  a  sizeable part of research 
expenditure. 
The  MacDougall  Committee  estimates that in order  to discharge 
all these  tasks  the  Community  would require  a  budget of  the order 
of  5-7  per cent of the Community's  GDP.  This  sum is much  smaller 
than the  top tier of spending in the  federations  which  the 
Community  studied  {between  ~0-25. per cent of GDP).  Nonetheless  the 
Committee  feels  that if the=_transfers  and equalisation mechanisms::  ,._ 
for  "sOcia). welfare  servic~s" and  "economic  services" ·were 
technically designed  to  be  as  redistributive as  possible,  then this 
.expenditure  (which  could be  financed  by  a  revenue  system based on 
VAT  but made  regionally progressive  by  virtue of national 
contributions being adjusted in accordance with  a  personal  income 
tax capacity key)  could attain the degree of redistribution 
achieved  in fully  integrated economies  elsewhere  . 
. /.  This  is a  conclusion 19 
This is a  conclusion of great significance. 
Ob:v-i(Ously  the MacDougall  report is not  a  source of infallible 
truth.  Its conclusions and  the methods  by  which it arrives 
at them must  be,  and  are being,  rigorously studied and  appraised. 
Startling though it may  seem,  it may  even  be  the case 
that HacDougall  overestimates  the cost of monetary  union.  For 
throughout  the report there is  a  tendency  to  assume  that  a 
significant degree of redistribution in the  Community  can only 
be  achieved by  action on  either the receipts or expenditure 
side of the budget.  Yet  this is far  from  being  the  case. 
For example,  effective regulations  concerning  the  location of 
new  investment can achieve  a  re-allocation of resources  towards 
deprived regions without entailing any  extra expenditure 
whatever.  Moreover,  this is  a  form of redistribution to which 
each Member  State is already well  accustomed within its own 
boundaries  and which  already plays  some  - rather uncoordinated  -
role in international investment planning.  The  possibility 
of this  type  and of other  non  budgetary methods  of 
redistribution is  one-wh~ch I  believe  should  be  examined  very 
..... t.;,  op  ~;J  ·, 
closely indeed. 
. I. In addi  tiOnc: 20 
In addition. to redistribution,the achievement of monetary 
union will of course require action on  other fronts.  It will, 
for example,  be  necessary to  remove  existing obstacles  to 
the creation of  a  single capital market  in the  Community, 
and progress will have  to  be  made  towards  greater harmonization 
of taxation.  But  problems of this kind are not insurmountable. 
And it is my  conviction  that once it is widely  understood that 
the budgetary cost of introducing  a  single currency is  - in 
relation to the potential economic  gains  - strikingly modest, 
the political determination on  the part of the Member  States 
necessary to deal with  reamining difficulties will become  swiftly 
and  irreversible manifest  . 
.  ' '.  ' 